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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS

REF: KHARTOUM 106

Classified By: AF Acting A/S Karl Wycoff

[¶1.](#) (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3 and [¶4.](#)

#### SUMMARY

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[¶2.](#) (S/NF) Department requests that Embassy Khartoum and Embassy N'Djamena urge the Governments of Chad and Sudan to cease support of opposing rebel groups and continue to work toward normalized relations. The USG remains committed to the Dakar agreement and normalized relations between Chad and Sudan, and we remain concerned about the negative impact of continued support of armed groups on our policy objectives in the region. Department also requests Embassy Tripoli and Embassy Brazzaville, Libreville, Dakar, and Asmara to use points below to encourage the Government of Libya and the rest of the Contact Group to play a positive role in defusing tensions between the two countries. End Summary.

#### OBJECTIVES

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[¶3.](#) (SBU) Department asks Embassy Khartoum and Embassy N'Djamena to pursue the following objectives with the Governments of Chad and Sudan at the highest appropriate levels:

-- Note USG concern about continued cross-border support by the Governments of Chad and Sudan for each other's rebel groups. Point out that the recent reported unification of Chadian rebel groups and continued clashes in Darfur involving the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has led many to believe both governments are assisting

in the activities of these rebel groups, respectively.

-- Urge both Chad and Sudan to cease any support for armed groups in the region. Highlight impact of continued violence in humanitarian and economic terms, undermining their countries' ability to pursue economic development. This conflict distracts valuable domestic resources and attention away from pressing social and economic needs.

-- Encourage both Chad and Sudan to continue the constructive dialogue that took place in the last Dakar Agreement Contact Group meeting in N'Djamena in November 2008, and take further steps to implement the Dakar agreement and normalize relations.

-- Note USG support for the Dakar Agreement and meetings among the Contact Group countries as a means to prevent a further deterioration of relations between Chad and Sudan, develop a longer-term peace building process, and bring stability to the region.

-- Point out that the USG is urging Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups to lay down their arms and maintain a peaceful dialogue with the Governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum. Especially at this fragile time of building a solid peace process and upcoming talks in Doha, continued violence is irresponsible and unhelpful.

-- (For N'Djamena): Encourage Chad to take steps to reach out to Chadian rebel groups to deter an imminent rebel attack. Note that while the Sirte process continues to remain a framework for peaceful negotiations with Chadian rebel groups, we encourage the Government of Chad to explore other avenues of dialogue. We would be interested to know if there is a structure/format for talks that the GoC would be comfortable with. This effort must be coupled with renewed efforts to implement the August 13, 2007 accord, laying the groundwork for credible legislative and communal elections, and initiatives to promote good governance in Chad. Reiterate that USG is pressing the Chadian rebels to lay down their arms and enter into the political process.

-- (For Khartoum): While the USG believes that JEM and all other Darfur rebel groups should be part of a political settlement in Darfur, we do not support JEM military action in Sudan and, as recently as this week, have condemned their attacks in Darfur.

-- Urge the parties to respect the security of humanitarian personnel working in the region, and respect the human rights of civilian populations.

14. (SBU) Department also asks Embassy Tripoli pursue the following objectives at appropriate levels:

-- Recognize the Government of Libya's past positive role in

facilitating  
the November 2008 exchange of ambassadors between Chad and  
Sudan and  
playing an integral role in previous Contact Group meetings.

-- Encourage Libya to play a positive role in mitigating the  
impact of  
recent allegations by Chad and Sudan of cross-border support,  
and  
consider a potential Head of State summit among Chad, Sudan,  
and Libya,  
as well as a Contact Group meeting in the near term.

-- Note the mutual interest of all members in the  
international community  
in improving Chad-Sudan relations. Ask Libya how the USG and  
the  
international community can be helpful in this process and to  
brief us  
on Libya's own efforts with N'Djamena and Khartoum.

¶5. (SBU) Department also asks Embassies Brazzaville,  
Libreville, Dakar,  
and Asmara to pursue the following objectives at appropriate  
levels:

-- Note USG concern with apparent signs of deteriorating  
relations between  
Chad and Sudan, and continued indications of cross-border  
support.

-- Ask whether the Contact Group plans to hold a meeting in  
the coming  
weeks to discuss ways to defuse the current tensions and  
continue efforts  
to facilitate the normalization of relations between Chad and  
Sudan.

#### BACKGROUND

¶6. (S/NF) The recent decision of Chadian rebel groups  
(currently based in  
Sudan) to form a new alliance, the United Resistance Front  
(UFR), and  
select prominent Zaghawa rebel Timan Erdimi as their leader  
has renewed  
fears of a rebel attack into Chad. While there are  
conflicting reports  
on whether Chadian rebels have begun to move toward the  
Chad-Sudan border,  
Chad's intelligence chief has asserted that the Government  
will be able to  
repel any rebel advances. In comparison to the last attack  
against the  
Chadian regime in February 2008, President Deby is stronger  
militarily,  
and continues to receive intelligence and logistical support  
from France.  
However, should the UFR be successful in launching attacks in  
Chad, clashes  
between Government and rebel forces will jeopardize our  
humanitarian  
operations in eastern Chad and complicate US efforts to bring  
peace to  
Darfur.

¶7. (S/NF) We continue to receive reports that cross-border  
support still  
continues, in spite of recent attempts by the Government of  
Libya and members  
the Dakar Agreement Contact Group to encourage both sides to  
normalize relations.  
The GoS and Sudanese Presidential Assistant Minni Minawi have  
noted that Chadian  
military officials have provided material support to the  
Justice and Equality  
Movement in the latest round of fighting in Muhajiriya and

near El-Fasher.

Both governments have already begun the public campaign of accusing each other of supporting the activities of Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups.

¶18. (S/NF) The United States and France have pressed both Khartoum and N'Djamena to cut support for the others' rebel forces. Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff has been in telephone contact with key rebel leaders to press them to enter into political talks with Deby. The unification of the Chad rebels indicates that new efforts are needed to prevent a rebel incursion into eastern Chad. To that end, the Department believes joint demarches to Khartoum and N'Djamena will be a strong first step in highlighting our concern about continued cross-border support and renewed tensions between the two governments.

¶19. (S) In addition, given Libya's prominent role in influencing relations with Chad and Sudan, it is critical that Libya take a leading role in trying to ease the current round of tense exchanges between Khartoum and N'Djamena. Finally, the Department still views the Contact Group as a viable mechanism to ensure that Chad and Sudan are openly communicating in the presence of regional partners, and would like Contact Group member states to support all efforts to ensure cross-border hostilities do not threaten the stability of the region.

#### REPORTING DEADLINE

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¶10. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to AF/C Desk Officer Jitu Sardar and AF/SPG by February 4.

#### POINT OF CONTACT

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¶11. (U) Please contact AF/C desk officer Jitu Sardar at (202) 647-4966 or via e-mail for any necessary further background information or argumentation to meet our objectives.

¶12. (U) Due to technical difficulties, this action request will be sent to Tripoli septel.  
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